Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP. Again, the United States
is on a typical trajectory, with capital inflows accelerating up to the eve of the crisis.
Indeed, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP.
As already mentioned, there is a large and growing literature that attempts to rationalize why the
United States might be able run a large sustained current account deficit without great
risk of trauma. Whether the U.S. case is quite as different as this literature suggests
remains to be seen.
Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4.
The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V shape that characterizes the
earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains low
for two years after.
In the more severe "Big Five" cases, however, the growth shock is
considerably larger and more prolonged than for the average. Of course this implies that
the growth effects are quite a bit less in the mildest cases, although the U.S. case has so
many markers of larger problems that one cannot take too much comfort in this caveat.
