Tolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with "Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way". While each financial crisis no doubt is distinct, they also share striking similarities, in the run up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
While in the case of the United States, there has been
no striking de jure liberalization, there certainly has been a de facto liberalization. New
unregulated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have come to play a much larger role
in the financial system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against some kinds of shocks,
but possibly increasing vulnerabilities against others. Technological progress has plowed
ahead, shaving the cost of transacting in financial markets and broadening the menu of
instruments.
Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despite
many superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse
comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many
argue. Nevertheless, the quantitative and qualitative parallels in run ups to earlier postwar
industrialized country financial crises are worthy of note.
Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove an important mitigating
factor. The United States does not suffer the handicap of a fixed exchange rate system.
On the other hand, the apparent decline in U.S. productivity growth and in housing prices
does not provide a particularly favorable backdrop for withstanding a credit contraction.
Another parallel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system
stood as an intermediary between oil exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers
in Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro dollar
recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed enormous strain on
money center banks. It is true that this time, a large volume of petro dollars are again
flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been running current
account surpluses, lending rather than borrowing.
Instead, a large chunk of money has
effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States
own borders. Over a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-prime mortgage market,
which is comprised of the poorest and least credit worth borrowers within the United
States. The final claimant is different, but in many ways, the mechanism is the same.
Finally, we note that although this paper has concentrated on the United States,
many of the same parallels hold for other countries that began experiencing housing price
duress during the 2007, including Spain, the United Kingdom and Ireland. There can be
similarities across unhappy families, too.
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Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1999. "The Twin Crises: The
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Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time is Different: Six Centuries
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Princeton, NJ:
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